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Gresham v. Davenport:' Minor Social Host Drinking
Liability, Where Does the Duty Lie?
Fifteen-year-old Molly, who had been living with her father, threw
a party at his home while he was out of town. During this party, Molly
served beer that she had obtained from Brian, an adult friend, to her
minor guests. After leaving the party, five of the minors who had been
drinking were involved in a serious car accident. In the suit that arose
from this accident, the trial court refused to impose liability on Molly
or Brian. The second circuit court of appeal reversed in part finding
Molly, but not Brian, liable.2 The supreme court reversed and reinstated
the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' demands. Gresham v. Davenport,
537 So. 2d 1144 (La. 1989).
Louisiana's judiciary has traditionally been hesitant to impose lia-
bility in the context of injuries caused by social drinking.3 In 1986 the
legislature codified this trend in Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2800.1, 4
which exempts from tort liability social hosts serving alcohol to guests
over the age of twenty-one. Since 1958 the legislature has provided
criminal sanctions for minors purchasing alcohol and for adults pur-
chasing alcohol on behalf of minors.' Gresham is troublesome because
it leaves unresolved the question whether liability should be imposed on
Copyright 1990, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW.
1. 537 So. 2d 1144 (La. 1989).
2. Gresham v. Davenport, 524 So. 2d 49 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988).
3. See Robinson v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 135 So. 2d 607 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1961). See also Note, Thrasher v. Legget! Judicial Restraint in the Imposition of Liquor
Vendor Liability, 40 La. L. Rev. 938 (1980); Note, Tort-Bar Owner's Liability to Patron
for Injuries Arising from Sale of Intoxicating Liquor, 51 Tul. L. Rev. 394 (1977).
4. La. R.S. 9:2800.1 (Supp. 1990). This statute provides for a limitation of liability
for loss connected with the sale, serving, or furnishing of alcoholic beverages to persons
holding permits to sell liquor and social hosts who have sold or served alcoholic beverages
to anyone over the lawful age for the purchase thereof. The proximate cause of any
injury is declared to be the consumption of the intoxicating beverages. For injuries to
third persons the insurer of the intoxicated person shall be primarily liable.
5. La. R.S. 14:91.1.A(l) (Supp. 1990) provides that "[ilt is unlawful for any person
seventeen years of age to purchase any alcoholic beverage either of high or low alcoholic
content."
La. R.S. 14:91.2 (Supp. 1990) provides that "[i]t is unlawful for any person under the
age of seventeen to purchase or possess any alcoholic beverage either of high or low
alcoholic content."
La. R.S. 14.91.3 (1986) provides that "[ilt is unlawful for any adult to purchase on
behalf of a person under the age of eighteen any alcoholic beverage either of high or
low alcoholic content."
Violations of the above three statutes are considered misdemeanor crimes.
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minors who supply other minors with alcohol for any resulting damages.
This article will examine the holding in Gresham to ascertain the
standard for determining liability for alcohol-related injuries involving
minors and compare Louisiana's treatment of these situations with that
of other states. First, the historical attitude of the common law toward
social hosts and liquor liability will be discussed along with current
trends in other jurisdictions. Second, the attitude of the Louisiana ju-
diciary toward the imposition of liability in these cases will be presented
along with the related statutes. Finally, this article will summarize 1)
how the test of liability for minor social hosts has been altered by the
supreme court's decision in Gresham and 2) the repercussions of the
new standard.
Historical View of the Common Law and Current Trends in Other
Jurisdictions
At common law there was no recovery against the providers of
alcoholic beverages. 6 Courts reasoned that the consumption of the alcohol
was the true cause of the injury, or constituted at least contributory
negligence and, as such, barred recovery.7 However, this jurisprudential
trend has recently been legislatively altered in many states by the en-
actment of civil damage, or "dram shop," statutes.8 A dissenting opinion
by Wisconsin Supreme Court Chief Justice Hallows in Garcia v. Hargrove9
may help explain the change in trend. Hallows stated that "the basis
upon which these cases were decided is sadly eroded by the shift from
commingling alcohol and horses to commingling alcohol and horse-
power. '10 Additionally, contributory negligence is no longer a complete
bar to recovery in tort suits." Even in the absence of a civil damage
statute, some courts have imposed liability based on the traditional
proximate cause analysis or on a statutory negligence theory.' 2
6. See, e.g., Hitson-v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. 2d 803, 143 P.2d 952 (Dist. Ct. App.
1943); Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1899); Cavin v. Smith, 228 Minn. 322,
37 N.W.2d 368 (1949).
7. See, e.g., Collier v. Stamatis, 63 Ariz. 285, 162 P.2d 125 (1945); Cookinham v.
Sullivan, 23 Conn. Supp. 193, 179 A.2d 840 (Super. Ct. 1962); Noonan v. Galick, 19
Conn. Supp. 308, 112 A.2d 892 (Super. Ct. 1955).
8. A civil damage or "dram shop" statute generally imposes strict liability on the
provider of intoxicating beverages to an individual where injury or damages to the
individual or others has resulted. See 48A C.J.S'. Intoxicating Liquors § 429 (1981).
9. 46 Wis. 2d 724, 737, 176 N.W.2d 566, 572 (1970) (Hallows, C.J., dissenting).
10. Id.
11. La. Civ. Code art. 2323; compare with Robinson v. Fidelity and Casualty Co.,
135 So. 2d 607 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
12. See, e.g.,-Galvin v. Jennings, 289 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1961); Waynick v. Chicago's
Last Dept. Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903, 80 S. Ct.
611 (1960); Vance v. United States, 355 F. Supp. 756 (D. Alaska 1973).
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The liability of social hosts for alcohol-related accidents involving
minors is currently in a state of flux. Many states have found that
violation of a penal statute prohibiting the sale or furnishing of alcohol
to a minor constitutes negligence per se. In Koback v. Crook3 plaintiff
received injuries after she left a party as a passenger on another guest's
motorcycle. The motorcycle driver, a minor, had become intoxicated at
the party and subsequently drove into a parked car. The Supreme Court
of Wisconsin held the social hosts, who were parents of one of the
students, liable because violation of Wisconsin's penal statute prohibiting
furnishing minors with alcohol was negligence per se. The court deter-
mined the extent of liability under the rules of comparative negligence.
Georgia, New York, and Michigan are additional jurisdictions that have
found a statutory duty or at least a prima facie case of negligence upon
violation of a statute prohibiting the furnishing of alcohol to minors.' 4
The courts reasoned that the legislative intent in enacting these statutes
was to protect minors from their own immaturity.
Other jurisdictions have refused to extend liability to social hosts.
In Bankston v. Brennan," a recent Florida decision, defendant had
served alcohol to a minor who became intoxicated. Upon leaving the
defendant's home, the minor struck a third party with his automobile.
Florida law' 6 provides immunity for anyone selling or furnishing alcohol
to an adult; however, it further provides that if alcohol is furnished to
a minor liability may result. The Florida Supreme Court found that
liability for providing minors with alcohol should be imposed only on
vendors, not on social hosts. Courts in Minnesota, Illinois, California
and Missouri have also found no liability existed when social hosts
provided minors with alcohol. 7 The courts avoided imposing liability
by stating that relief against social hosts was prevented due to statutory
immunity (extending the statutes to minors) or that the statutes pro-
hibiting this activity applied liability only to licensees.
Louisiana Jurisprudence
Louisiana has no civil damage, or "dram shop," statute. Claims
of this nature are generally based on Louisiana Civil Code articles 2315
13. 123 Wis. 2d 259, 366 N.W.2d 857 (1985).
14. See Sutter v. Hastings, 254 Ga. 194, 327 S.E.2d 716 (1985); Longstreth v. Gensel,
423 Mich. 675, 377 N.W.2d 804 (1985); Montgomery v. Orr, 130 Misc. 2d 807, 498
N.Y.S.2d 968 (Sup. Ct. 1986). See also Lindgren and Ream, Social Host Liability and
Minor Guests, For the Defense, June 1986, at 2.
15. 507 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 1987).
16. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.125 (West 1986).
17. See Bass v. Pratt, 177 Cal. App. 3d 129, 222 Cal. Rptr. 723 (Ct. App. 1986);
Zamiar v. Linderman, 132 Il. App. 3d 886, 478 N.E.2d 534 (App. Ct. 1985); Holmquist
v. Miller, 367 N.W.2d 468 (Minn. 1985); Harriman v. Smith, 697 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1985). See also Lindgren and Ream, supra note 14, at 2.
1990]
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and 2316.18 Before 1976, Louisiana courts refused to impose liability on
the providers of alcoholic beverages, reasoning that the true cause of
any subsequent injuries was consumption of the alcohol. 9 Pence v.
Ketchum20 overruled this theory in 1976. In Pence, a car struck the
plaintiff after she had been ejected from defendant's bar while intoxi-
cated. The court found that defendant had breached a statutory duty
by serving an intoxicated patron additional alcohol. To prevent plaintiff's
claim from being barred by contributory negligence, the court applied
the doctrine of last clear chance and allowed recovery.
Three years later, however, in Thrasher v. Leggett2 the supreme
court reconsidered the analysis applied in Pence and overruled it. In
Thrasher, the intoxicated plaintiff was injured in a fall when the bar
bouncer attempted to eject him. The court held that the proximate cause
of the injury was plaintiff's consumption of alcohol, not defendant's
actions. The court found that absolute liability did not apply, that the
duty owed by a bar owner was simply to avoid affirmative acts that
would increase the risks to an intoxicated person and that a "reasonable
man" standard would apply in ascertaining whether liability should be
imposed.
One of the earliest Louisiana cases dealing with minors involved in
alcohol-related accidents was Robinson v. Fidelity and Casualty Co.22
Here the first circuit court of appeal concluded that although defendant
violated penal statutes by selling alcohol to a minor plaintiff, contributory
negligence barred plaintiff's claim. A similar scenario arose in Chausse
v. Southland Corporation, 2 in which a suit was brought against a beer
seller for wrongful death and for the injuries of three minors resulting
from an alcohol-related car accident. The three minors were passengers;
the driver was intoxicated and was also a minor. The first circuit held
that defendant had breached a statutorily-imposed duty by selling alcohol
to minors and that contributory negligence would not bar plaintiffs'
recovery. The court agreed with plaintiffs' contention that
where the purpose of the statute is to protect the minor against
the risk of his own negligence . . . the general rule is that the
18. La. Civ. Code art. 2315 provides in part that "lelvery act whatever of man that
causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."
La. Civ. Code art. 2316 provides that "[e]very person is responsible for the damage
he occasions not merely by his act, but by his negligence, his imprudence, or his want
of skill."
19. See Lee v. Peerless Insurance Co., 248 La. 982, 183 So. 2d 328 (1966).
20. 326 So. 2d 831, 838 (La. 1976).
21. 373 So. 2d 494 (La. 1979).
22. 135 So. 2d 607 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).




minor's contributory negligence or assumption of the risk will
not defeat recovery for his injury or death, the very risk and
harm the statute was designed to prevent.24
The court additionally found the Thrasher rationale inapplicable here
because the legislature's intent was to keep minors from drinking.2
The only recent case dealing with the imposition of liability for
serving alcohol to minors came out of the fifth circuit court of appeal
in 1988. Clement v. Armoniet 26 involved a suit against an adult social
host who served "an uncontrolled amount" of liquor to minors at a
party at which a fight broke out. 27 The court found that while one of
these minors was "the source of most of the trouble," he was only ten
percent at fault, because the host was wrong in serving him. 2 The court,
applying Louisiana law, did not discuss any statutory duty of the host
not to serve a minor; rather, it merely said his actions were "contrary
to the reasonable standard of behavior for any normal young adult. ' 29
Relevant Louisiana Statutes
The Louisiana legislature has recently codified the historical trend
of judicial restraint toward the imposition of liability in alcohol-related
cases with the enactment of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2800.1.30 This
statute limits the liability for loss connected with the sale, serving, or
furnishing of alcoholic beverages and declares consumption of the alcohol
to be the proximate cause of any alcohol-related damages. Although it
specifically limits liability for adults who serve alcohol to individuals
over the age for lawful purchase, no mention of minors is made within
the statute. The possession of alcohol by minors is specifically addressed
by penal statutes: Louisiana Revised Statues 14:91 through 91.3. 3 As
the supreme court pointed out in Gresham, however, absolute liability
does not necessarily result from the violation of these penal statutes.
Further, because these only focus on situations in which minors are in
possession of alcohol or in which adults furnish them with alcohol, the
Gresham situation, in which the provider of alcohol to the minor plain-
tiffs is a minor herself, is left unaddressed. 32
24. Id. at 1202 (citing Boyer v. Johnson, 360 So. 2d 1164, 1169 (La. 1978)).
25. Id. at 1203.
26. 527 So. 2d 1004 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 531 So. 2d 475 (1988).
27. Id. at 1009.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. La. R.S. 9:2800.1 (Supp. 1990).
31. La. R.S. 14:91-91.3 (1986 and Supp. 1990).




Defendant, fifteen-year-old Molly, had planned a party while her
father was out of town. Eighteen-year-old Brian purchased three cases
of beer at Molly's request. Five teen-age boys who attended the party
were involved in a one-car accident on their way home. The driver was
killed, and two of the passengers were seriously injured, when an in-
toxicated front passenger grabbed the car's steering wheel. The parents
of the two injured passengers brought this suit against the mother of
the deceased driver and her insurer, against Molly's father as owner of
the home at which the party occurred and his homeowner's insurance
company, and against Brian, the adult who had purchased the liquor,
and his insurer.
The trial judge rejected the plaintiffs' demands, finding no causal
connection linked the party, the beer, and the accident. The second
circuit court of appeal reversed this decision in part." The court of
appeal found that Molly had a duty not to furnish alcohol to minors,
which she had breached, and that the risk of an intoxicated car passenger
acting irresponsibly (grabbing the steering wheel) was within the scope
of this duty. The court of appeal found that although Brian had a duty
not to purchase liquor for a minor and had breached the duty, the risk
encountered was not within this duty.
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal decision
and reinstated the judgment of the trial court dismissing plaintiffs'
claims.34 The supreme court found that although Molly's conduct was
a cause-in-fact of the accident, "it would be doubtful that Molly had
a duty not to serve beer," 35 and even if she had such a duty, the
particular risk of serving beer to a minor who would later grab the
steering wheel was not easily associable with her conduct. a6
Additionally, the supreme court found it unlikely that the legislature
33. Gresham v. Davenport, 524 So. 2d 48 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988).
34. In Gresham the supreme court did not address the issue of the liability of Brian,
the adult who purchased the beer for Molly. The second circuit found that although Brian
breached a duty, the subsequent risk was not within this duty. One must question the
reasoning behind this finding because Brian purchased three cases of beer for Molly. It
is unlikely that a fifteen-year-old girl intended to drink this much alcohol alone; obviously
other minors would be drinking with her.
35. 537 So. 2d at 1147.
36. It should be noted that Molly's mother, not her father, was Molly's legal guardian.
No substitution of the parties was made nor even addressed by the supreme court. The
court of appeal had found the father not to be vicariously liable; however, it did hold




intended this risk to be covered by Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:91.2, 3"
which provides criminal penalties for minors purchasing alcohol. The
supreme court thus rejected the contention that absolute liability should
be imposed on a minor social host who serves intoxicating liquor to
another minor.3" The supreme court analogized this situation to Thrasher
v. Leggett,3 9 in which an alcoholic beverage retailer was found not to
be absolutely liable for actions occurring after serving an already-in-
toxicated patron. The court found that the intoxicated patron's injuries
were caused by his own behavior rather than the bar owner's breach
of duty.
Analysis
Gresham is troublesome in three respects: 1) the supreme court's
determination of whether a duty existed under the circumstances; 2) the
court's narrow application of the test of ease of association; and 3) the
court's failure to enunciate a standard of care for minor social hosts
serving alcohol to other minors.
In determining whether Molly was liable for the injuries, the court
of appeal found Molly to have breached a duty:
It is apparent from an examination of our statutory law on the
subject that, as a matter of public policy, we attempt to keep
alcoholic beverages out of the hands of minors, recognizing that
this could result in harm both to the minor and to third parties.4
The appellate court further found that the risk that one of the car
passengers would act in an unruly manner was within Molly's duty.
Molly saw the boys getting into their vehicle and even gave them a six-
pack of beer to take with them.
The supreme court addressed the issue of Molly's liability differently
finding that the situation was not covered by any existing statutory law
and that even if the criminal statutes could be extended to include this
scenario, they would be mere guidelines for the court .4  Finding it
doubtful that Molly had a duty under these circumstances, the supreme
court noted that neither Molly nor the intoxicated car passenger "was
a novice to drinking, having both been drinking beer occasionally on
the weekends for about a year. "42
37. La. R.S. 14:91.2 (Supp. 1990). This statute now provides that "[i]t is unlawful
for any person under the age of seventeen to purchase or possess any alcoholic beverage
of either high or low alcoholic content."
38. 537 So. 2d at 1148.
39. 373 So. 2d 494 (La. 1979).
40. 524 So. 2d 49, 51 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988).
41. 537 So. 2d at 1147.
42. Id.
19901
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Since drinking is clearly an adult activity, the supreme court's com-
ments on the teenagers' familiarity with alcohol suggests that in this
case an adult standard of care should be applied. The court failed,
however, to apply or even to refer to the adult standard for social
hosts, enunciated by the legislature in Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:2800. 1.4 If the supreme court meant that because both parties were
familiar with alcohol and equally at fault, it could have used comparative
fault in determining liability.
Additionally, this interpretation implies that the only type of duty
considered to have existed was a statutory duty. The standard of care
of a reasonable man in like circumstances was not even discussed.
Certainly the only duties owed are not statutory ones. The court failed
to address the question of whether the standard should be that of a
reasonable minor in like circumstances or that of an adult. Generally,
minors engaged in an adult activity are held to an adult standard of
care." This would, however, be contrary to the legislatively provided
age requirement implemented to prevent minors from drinking.
Automobile accidents are the most notorious of all alcohol-related
injuries. Rather than using this general risk as the test of ease of
association, the supreme court considered more specific factors. The
court focused on the fact that an intoxicated passenger caused the
accident, rather than on the fact that a car accident occurred. The
supreme court further concluded that even if Molly had a duty, the
subsequent risk was not within this duty. The court stated "there is no
indication that such a risk was within the legislative intent in passing
the statute prohibiting a minor from purchasing alcoholic beverages. '45
This analysis ignores the unpredictable behavior common among intox-
icated persons that causes many alcohol-related accidents to occur. Gen-
eral results, such as car accidents or drownings, are foreseeable; however,
the specific manner in which they occur is often dependent upon the
varying effects of alcohol on each individual. The supreme court's
determination, that the risk in Gresham was not within the legislative
intent in passing statutes prohibiting minors from drinking, derogates
from jurisprudence indicating the general, not specific, risk should con-
trol in cases involving alcohol-related damages.4 6
43. La. R.S. 9:2800.1 (Supp. 1990).
44. W. Prosser and W. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 32, at 181 (5th ed. 1984).
45. 537 So. 2d at 1147-48.
46. In the following cases the courts imposed liability on plaintiffs for furnishing
minors with alcohol because the resulting risks were within the plaintiffs' duties: St. Hill
v. Tabor, 542 So. 2d 499 (La. 1989) (duty: "to act as a 'reasonable' person and to guard
against unreasonable risks of injury or harm to her guests;" risk: "that one of the guests
at the party would drown," id. at 502); Garcia v. Jennings, 427 So. 2d 1329 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1983) (duty: not to furnish alcohol to a minor and having done so, to exercise
[Vol. 50
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With its decision in Gresham, the supreme court has clearly created
the need for the legislature to address situations involving minor social
hosts, because it fails to enunciate a standard for minor social hosts
serving alcohol to other minors. Penal statutes, Louisiana Revised Sta-
tutes 14:91-91.3, impose strict penalties for furnishing minors with al-
cohol. A civil statute, Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2800.1, imposes non-
liability for adult social hosts serving alcohol to other adults, but none
of these statutes contain provisions for situations in which minors furnish
alcohol to other minors. For example, if a sixteen-year-old were to give
liquor to a ten-year-old, both minors would be statutorily liable for
possession of the alcohol. If the ten-year-old were to cause damage to
property or to another individual, under the Gresham analysis no stat-
utory liability would exist for the sixteen-year-old who supplied the
alcohol. In fact, if a ten-year-old were not a novice to drinking, it
appears a sixteen-year-old would not even have a duty not to furnish
that younger minor with alcohol.
Fortunately, the legislature limited the non-liability of social hosts
to situations where the guests are adults. However, Gresham appears
to jurisprudentially extend this non-liability of social hosts to minors
depending upon the minor's experience with alcohol. The legislature
determined the proximate cause of alcohol-related injury to be the adult's
consumption of alcohol in Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2800.1. If the
legislature intended the providing of alcohol to minors to be the prox-
imate cause of injury then, as the penal statutes suggest, the legislature
needs to provide a standard for all situations involving minors. What
will happen when a twenty-year-old (a minor by law) hosts a party, and
a twenty-one-year-old (a legal adult) becomes intoxicated and subse-
quently injures himself or others? Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2800.1
may cover this situation and limit the liability of the minor social host,
since the guest is over the age of twenty-one and since the statute does
not limit its applicability to adult social hosts. Yet this result is contrary
to the competing policy contained in Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:91.1,
which prohibits minors from possessing or purchasing alcohol. It appears
the courts are moving away from using the penal statutes involved here
even as guidelines. It is clear, therefore, that legislative action is necessary
to enunciate when and where a duty lies when minors are involved in
social drinking, particularly when a minor is the provider of the alcohol
to other minors.
a degree of protection toward the minor, and certainly refrain from affirmative acts which
place the minor in peril; risk: "falling into a bayou and drowning," id. at 1333); Chausse
v. Southland Corp., 400 So. 2d 1199 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 404 So. 2d 278,
497 and 498 (1981) (duty: statutory duty prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages to
minors; risk: "death and injury due to the girls' improvident riding with another inebriated
teenager" in an automobile, id. at 1203).
1990)
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Conclusion
In Gresham, several minors were injured in an automobile accident
after a minor social host served them beer. The trial court dismissed
plaintiffs' claims, finding that no causal connection linked the beer, the
party, and the accident. The appellate court reversed and imposed liability
on the minor social host. The supreme court reversed and reinstated
the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' action.
The Gresham decision is troublesome because it leaves unanswered
the question of liability when minors serve alcohol to other minors who
cause damages as a result of their intoxication. Penal statutes prohibit
minors from possessing alcohol, but the Gresham court found them to
be inapplicable. The court applied a duty-risk analysis, finding that no
liability existed, because even if a duty not to serve the alcohol to minors
existed, the risk of an intoxicated car passenger grabbing the steering
wheel was not within this duty. The court made no mention of com-
parative fault or of the reasonable man standard of care. Further the
court did not discuss the recently-enacted social host non-liability statute.
After Gresham it appears that the trend of judicial restraint in imposing
liability for alcohol-related accidents has been extended to situations
involving minors.
Katherine M. Romeo
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